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1 Introduction 
A number of recent theoretical papers, including McKinnon and Pill (1997), Corsetti 
et al. (1999), Huang and Xu (1999), and Schneider and Tornell (2004) have analyzed 
the role of over-investment and over-borrowing in financial crises. McKinnon and Pill 
(1997) argue that in an inadequate regulatory framework, banks can inflate 
entrepreneurs’ expected payoffs, knowing that in case of default the government will be 
forced to bail out distressed borrowers. The entrepreneurs, lacking sufficient 
information to assess banks’ signals, tend to consider them as correct. As a result, they 
bid eagerly for funds and a lending-investment boom ensues. In Corsetti et al. (1999) 
analysis, a financial crisis erupts as a result of potential future fiscal deficits that are 
implied by moral hazard behaviour in private corporate and financial investment. The 
latter leads to over-investment, which can persist for as long as domestic firms are able 
to refinance their unprofitable projects and cash shortfalls through foreign borrowing – a 
process known as ‘evergreening’. Only when international reserves fall below a certain 
threshold1, foreign investors’ willingness to rollover credit would cease, causing a 
financial crisis. In a similar vein Huang and Xu (1999) argue that over-investment in 
South Korea was due to soft budget constraints, which enabled large industrial 
conglomerates (chaebols) to have continuous access to subsidized policy loans. In such 
an economy, there is no mechanism to ensure that bad projects are terminated because 
bad signals are not revealed to investors or depositors, creating unduly optimistic 
expectations. Hence, loss making projects can be hidden for a long time by over-
borrowing. These problems only become apparent when an exogenous shock hits the 
economy. 
This paper provides an empirical investigation of the over-borrowing hypothesis in 
South Korea using a novel approach. Specifically, our modeling strategy takes into 
account the institutional characteristics of the South Korean credit market, including the 
direct effects of financial repression that were prevalent until the late 1980s. 
Additionally, we utilize time series econometric techniques that allow us to construct a 
measure of short-run disequilibrium in the credit market.2 Unlike previous attempts to 
model disequilibrium behavior in the credit market that rule out the presence of a 
realized excess supply by assumption, our approach allows the actual stock of credit to 
be above or below its long-run equilibrium value, which is determined by economic 
fundamentals. 
Our results show that, with few exceptions, the Korean credit market had been 
characterized by excessive credit creation since the late 1960s. That is to say, the actual 
stock of credit is found to be greater than its long-run equilibrium level predicted by 
economic fundamentals, such as real economic activity and the cost of credit. Our 
estimates of excess credit may be interpreted as measures of ‘unproductive credit’ in the 
sense that it was not used to finance productive economic activity. The presence of 
                                                 
1   In Corsetti et al. (1999), the threshold is expressed as a fraction of implicit government liabilities 
which mainly arise due to excessive foreign borrowing by the private sector and over-investment in 
low productivity projects. It is interesting to note that these implicit government liabilities can coexist 
with a low public debt and budget deficit.  
2   See for example Hendry (1995) or the papers in the Engle and Granger (1991) edited volume.    2
excess credit indicates the existence of loss-making projects that were continually being 
refinanced by banks. Thus, our empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions of Huang and Xu (1999) and Corsetti et al. (1999). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some methodological 
issues while section 3 presents the empirical specification and results. The last section 
summarizes and concludes. 
2 Methodological  issues 
In evaluating whether a credit market is characterized by disequilibrium conditions 
previous empirical studies, such as Laffont and Garcia (1977) and Pazarbasioglu (1996), 
have used the model of supply and demand from Maddala and Nelson (1974). This 
approach assumes that in some markets, prices are not perfectly flexible and hence 
disequilibrium could occur. In the absence of any information concerning the price-
adjustment process, the probability with which each observation belongs to the demand 
or supply function is determined by assuming that the short side of the market is never 
rationed. Maddala and Nelson (1974) derive the appropriate maximum likelihood 
method for this class of models. 
By stipulating that the long side of the market is the one that is rationed, the traditional 
disequilibrium approach, while allowing for notional excess supply, has ruled out the 
possibility of an effective excess supply of credit. That is to say, in the traditional 
approach an excess supply of credit can only represent the case in which banks would 
like to supply more credit than firms are willing to accept; thus, without coercion, an 
excess supply of credit can never be realized. In practice, however, excessive credit 
creation may refer to the possibility that firms take on more credit than is predicted by 
the long-run determinants of the demand for credit – which typically include the cost of 
credit and an indicator of real economic activity. Excess credit – which we define to be 
the excess of actual credit to the amount predicted by the long-run demand for credit – 
may be the result of loss-making projects that are continually being refinanced by 
banks. The main reason why banks refinance unprofitable projects is their reluctance to 
admit publicly that they have problematic assets, which would reduce their stock market 
value and hamper their ability to raise capital. In extreme cases, when the amount of 
non-performing assets exceeds shareholders’ capital, admitting the presence of 
problematic loans is tantamount to declaring insolvency. In such circumstances, it is not 
unusual for banks to postpone taking action, in the hope that an economic upturn will 
allow firms to eventually repay their loans. Ultimately, of course, there is also the hope 
that when the problem threatens the soundness of many financial institutions and the 
stability of the financial system, some large corporates may be bailed out by the 
government. Thus, our notion of excess credit corresponds closely to the notion of over-
borrowing, reflecting soft budget constraints and/or moral hazard (Huang and Xu 1999; 
Corsetti et al. 1999). 
The preceding analysis suggests that the effective or short-run stock of credit may well 
exceed the long-run desired demand for credit. It is, therefore, vital to allow for the 
possibility that a short-run observation may belong to neither the long-run demand nor 
the  long-run supply function. In spite of the short-run deviations from long-run 
equilibrium, it is nevertheless plausible to expect to see some adjustment towards long-  3
run market equilibrium for both demand and supply functions.3 This is consistent with 
both theoretical and empirical work. For instance, despite the presence of information 
asymmetry, Laffont and Garcia (1977) find that the real interest rate has the tendency to 
adjust upwards when there is excess demand for credit. On the other hand, when there is 
an excess supply of credit, there is no reason why the interest rate should not fall to 
equilibrate the credit market (Greenwald et al. 1993). 
Thus, in order to allow for the presence of unproductive credit, our estimation strategy 
differs from the traditional disequilibrium approach outlined above in the following four 
important respects.  
—  It assumes that in the long-run, the interest rate adjusts to equilibrate the credit 
market while allowing for departures from long-run equilibrium to occur in the 
short-run.  
—  It does not impose a priori restrictions on the speed of adjustment, which 
admits the possibility that the credit market may take a very long time to clear. 
Thus, the assumption that in the long-run market equilibrium prevails is not a 
restrictive one because how long the long-run is, is determined by the data. 
—  It does not depend on estimating a set of probabilities which are then used to 
locate an observation on the long-run demand or supply function. Instead, it 
identifies excess supply or demand by measuring the difference between the 
actual stock of credit and its predicted long-run equilibrium value, utilizing 
standard techniques in applied time-series econometrics. 
—  It allows the possibility that the actual stock of credit may exceed the long-run 
demand for credit, representing an excess supply of credit in the short-run, 
which the traditional disequilibrium approach does not admit. 
3  Empirical specification, data, and results 
In this section we specify a model for the long-run demand for and supply of bank 
credit, which takes into account the institutional characteristics of the South Korean 
credit market. 
The long-run supply of credit equation 
The real supply of loans in the long-run is assumed to be determined by the real lending 
interest rate (r), the current level of economic activity, measured by real gross domestic 
product (GDP) (y), and the institutional characteristics of the credit market, measured by 
the degree of financial repression. The first two variables are widely used in empirical 
studies to capture respectively the profitability of banks’ lending activities and their 
expectations about the state of the economy (Laffont and Garcia 1977; Pazarbasioglu 
1996). The third variable has not been addressed in the empirical literature on credit 
markets (Pazarbasioglu 1996; Ghosh and Ghosh 1999), despite the presence of financial 
                                                 
3   In a way, this implies that any government policy providing financial guarantees to firms is eventually 
removed.   4
restraints in almost all developing countries and some developed countries. Since the 
early 1960s, one of the most important institutional characteristics of the South Korean 
credit market has been the direct intervention of the state in the allocation and pricing of 
credit.4 This was mainly achieved through controls on lending and deposit interest rates. 
Interest rate deregulation, which began in 1979, was only completed in the early 1990s. 
The impact of interest rate controls on the real supply of credit is not straightforward. In 
principle, lending rate controls, by limiting banks’ profitability, may reduce the real 
supply of credit to the private sector. However, as noted by Caprio (1994), in the 
presence of higher interest rates, which usually follow financial liberalization, banks 
may choose to hold larger amounts of riskless assets and hence supply fewer loans to 
the private sector. Hence, the impact of the relaxation of lending rate controls on the 
supply of credit is ambiguous. The same conclusion holds for the impact of deposit rate 
controls on the supply of real credit, even though the reasoning is different. On the one 
hand, these controls limit the cost of funds for banks and hence increase the willingness 
of banks to supply increased amounts of credit. On the other hand, however, deposit rate 
controls limit the supply of funds to the banking system which, unless counteracted by 
other means, such as increased branching or marketing, are likely to reduce the ability 
of banks to supply increased amounts of credit. 
In addition to interest rate controls, the South Korean government imposed reserve 
requirements on bank deposits (demand and/or time and savings deposits). Usually, the 
definition of bank reserves includes short-term government paper and/or central bank 
deposits, which typically yield a lower rate of return than bank loans. Hence, increases 
in reserve requirements raise the average cost of loanable funds and are, therefore, 
expected to result in an inward shift of the supply of credit to the private sector. 
Thus, we use the following specification for the long-run supply of credit (C
s):  
C
s = β0 +β1 y + β2 r + β3 IRL + β4RR + ut  (1) 
where IRL is an index of interest rate restraints, RR is the required reserve ratio and ut is 
a white noise error term. 
The long-run demand for credit equation  
We assume that the long-run demand for (productive) credit depends positively on the 
level of real economic activity, measured by real GDP (y), and negatively on the cost of 
credit, measured by the real lending rate (r). Formally, we use the following 
specification for the long-run demand for credit (C
d): 
C
d = α0 + α1 y + α2 r + vt  (2) 
where vt is a white noise error term. 
                                                 
4    For a detailed discussion of the extent of financial repression in South Korea and its impact on 
financial development see Demetriades and Luintel (2001).    5
Reduced form 
We assume that in the long-run, the real interest rate is flexible enough to equate the 
real supply and demand for credit, that is, the exchanged quantity of credit is such that: 
C = C
d = C
s  (3) 
We next solve for the reduced form equation by substituting the value of r  from 
equation (2) in (1) to obtain the following: 
C = γ0 + γ1 y + γ2IRR + γ3RR + wt   (4) 
where  γ0 = (α2β0 - α0β2 /α2 -β2) 
γ1 = (α2β1 - α1β2 /α2 -β2);    γ1 > 0 
γ2 = (α2β3 /α2 -β2)     γ2 >0 or γ2 <0 
γ3 = (α2β4 /α2 -β2)   γ3 <0 
3.1 Data 
The dependent variable is measured by (the logarithm of) broad claims on the private 
sector deflated by the GDP deflator. Real broad credit constitutes claims on the private 
sector by deposit money banks, trust accounts of commercial banks, development 
banks, and non-bank financial institutions. The data source for these variables, as well 
as for real GDP and the GDP deflator, is the International Financial Statistics (IMF 
1998: 6). 
The construction of the index of interest rate restraints utilizes the detailed information 
about financial reforms summarized in Appendix A, which was obtained from Bank of 
Korea Annual Reports (various issues). The index is assumed to take a value of unity 
prior to any relaxations, and decreases in value whenever restrictions on interest rates 
are relaxed or removed; it is therefore increasing with the severity of financial 
restraints, and decreasing as financial liberalization progresses. Initially, we constructed 
separate indices for controls on deposit rates, lending rates, and money market rates. 
Since these indices were found to exhibit strong positive correlation between them, we 
averaged them out into a single measure, which we call ‘the interest rate restraints 
index’. This measure is plotted in Figure 1. Its movements reflect the changes in the 
underlying policy variable reasonably well. The relaxation of lending controls in 1979 is 
reflected in a drop in the measure for that year. The measure then exhibits relative 
stability until 1988, when it drops sharply following the liberalization of interest rates 
on lending and certain types of time and savings deposits. Further drops are observed in 
the early 1990s reflecting further deregulation in deposit rates and lending rates on 
policy loans.   6
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Data on required reserve ratios on (a) demand and (b) time and saving deposits were 
collected from Bank of Korea Annual Reports (various issues).5 Because of the very 
high correlation between the two ratios, we use their arithmetic average as a summary 
measure of reserve requirements (RR). This measure, illustrated in Figure 2, registers an 
upward jump during 1966-67, which coincides with the first wave of reforms that saw 
large increases in interest rates and reserve requirements, resulting in increased state 
control over the banking system (Harris 1988). RR exhibits a decline during 1968-71 
and fluctuates widely in the 1970s. In the early 1980s, the index shows a sharp decline, 
which coincides with the relaxation of lending rate controls while the 1987-89 period 
registered considerable increases in reserve requirements. In the 1990s, RR exhibits 
relative stability to decline significantly in 1997 when reserve requirements on all types 
of deposits were set at 2 per cent. 
                                                 
5   Luarens and Cardoso (1998) argue that indices based only on the reserve requirement ratio and that do 
not take into account the continued changes in the tax base cannot capture accurately the 
restrictiveness of reserve requirements. This argument applies to the Chilean case where authorities 
have continuously changed the tax base to close loopholes and make the controls more restrictive. In 
the case of Korea, however, there have been no attempts to change the tax base and as such the index 
we use in this paper remains valid.   7
To test the robustness of our results to the measurement of financial repression, we also 
use (a) the actual ratio of bank reserves to bank deposits and (b) the inflation rate as 
alternative proxies of the degree of financial repression (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 
1992, 1995; Haslag and Koo 1999). The ratio of actual bank reserves to bank deposits 
differs from the required reserve ratio by the amount of excess reserves. Banks may 
hold excess reserves when there are regulatory restrictions that limit the development of 
interbank markets or when other regulatory structures push them to do so (Roubini and 
Salai-Marin 1992, 1995). Thus, the ratio of bank reserves to deposits can serve as a 
useful proxy of the degree of financial repression (Haslag and Koo 1999). We expect 
increases in the ratio of actual reserves to deposits to result in an inward shift of the 
supply of credit to the private sector. The inflation rate acts like a tax on financial 
intermediation, as it reduces the real rate of return on bank reserves. As noted by Fry 
(1995), substantial use of the inflation tax has usually been accompanied by high 
reserve requirements. We measure inflation as the percentage change in the GDP 
deflator. The data source for bank reserves, demand deposits and the GDP deflator is the 
International Financial Statistics (IMF 1998: 6). 
3.2  Method of estimation  
All variables were initially subjected to unit root tests, which suggested that the measure 
of the stock of credit, as well as real GDP, the index of interest rate restraints, reserve 
requirements, and the ratio of bank reserves to bank deposits are non-stationary. Since 
these variables contain unit roots, we use a cointegration estimator to estimate the 
reduced form relationship between them given by equation (4). Specifically, we apply 
the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) estimator (Saikkonen 1991; Stock and 
Watson 1993). This estimator is asymptotically equivalent to Johansen’s (1988) 
maximum-likelihood estimator in the case where variables are integrated of order one 
and there is a single cointegrating vector. Moreover, it has been shown to perform well 
in finite samples relative to other asymptotically efficient estimators (Stock and Watson 
1993). In these circumstances it is known that the Engle-Granger (1987) estimator may 
exhibit substantial bias (Banerjee et al. 1986; Stock and Watson 1993). DOLS has a 
further advantage over the Engle-Granger estimator. While the latter suffers from a non-
standard asymptotic distribution (Park and Phillips 1988), the former allows valid and 
efficient inferences on the parameters of the cointegrating vector. We first apply DOLS 
to the reduced-form equation (equation 4) and obtain estimates of the cointegrating 
vector for the credit market. We next compute the predicted long-run equilibrium values 
and compare them with the corresponding actual stock of real credit, which allows us to 
construct our measure of disequilibrium credit.  
3.3 Empirical  results 
Table 1 reports the results of estimating equation (4) using different sets of explanatory 
variables. In Model A, we include the index of interest rate restraints and the reserve 
requirement ratio as indicators of the degree of financial repression. The explanatory 
variables enter with the expected signs and are statistically significant. The estimated 
coefficient of real GDP has the expected positive sign, takes a plausible value, and is 
statistically significant. The interest rate restraints index enters with a negative sign, 
indicating that relaxation of interest rate controls results in an increase in the 
equilibrium stock of real credit to the private sector. The reserve requirement ratio   8
enters with the expected negative sign and is also statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level indicating that higher required reserve ratios are associated with lower credit 
to the private sector. The equation performs well as reflected in high R
2 and passes 
various diagnostic tests. Finally, according to the Dickey-Fuller and Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller statistics, the hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals is rejected at the 
5 per cent level. Thus, Model A represents a cointegrating relationship. 
 
Table 1: Cointegrating vector for the credit market 
(sample period: 1954-1997) 































    





No. of OBS  37 37  37  37 
Diagnostic tests        
Adj-R
2 0.995  0.995  0.996  0.996 
J-B 2.518[0.283]  4.35  [0.108]  5.844 [0.755]  1.007 [0.604] 
Q(10,0) 7.660[0.568]  14.44  [0.110]  0.988 [0.610] 7.214  [0.614] 
Cointegration test        
DF -4.070*  -4.273*  -5.208*  -5.038* 
ADF(1) -3.401*  -4.028*  -4.771*  -4.649* 
Notes:  The dependent variable is (the logarithm of) real broad claims on private sector by deposit 
money banks, development banks, non-bank financial institutions and trust accounts of 
commercial banks. The GDP deflator deflates this variable.  
  LY denotes the logarithm of real GDP, IRL is the index of interest rate liberalization; RR is the 
index of required reserve ratios; RES/DEP is the ratio of bank reserves to deposits, and INF is 
the inflation rate measured by the percentage change in the GDP deflator. The equation also 
includes a dummy variable for year 1968 onwards to account for the structural break in the real 
broad claims series. Figures in parentheses are the adjusted-standard errors for long-run 
variance (see Hamilton 1994). 
  The method of estimation is DOLS (Stock and Watson 1993). Given the small number of 
observations, to avoid over-parameterization we only retain significant lags and leads (Inder 
1995). 
  J-B is Jaques Berra’s test for normality; Q is Ljung-Box test for autocorrelation. Figures in 
brackets are the p-values. 
  * Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level. 
   9
In Model B, we use the inflation rate and the ratio of bank reserves to deposits as 
alternative indicators of the degree of financial repression. The estimated coefficient of 
real GDP increases marginally and is statistically significant. The ratio of bank reserves 
to deposits enters with the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the 
1 per cent level. On the other hand, the inflation rate is not significant at conventional 
levels. Model B performs reasonably well and passes various diagnostic tests. 
Furthermore, the hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 5 per cent level indicating 
that Model B forms a cointegrating vector.  
In Model C, in addition to the ratio of bank reserves to deposits and inflation, we 
include the index of interest rate restraints. Interestingly, both bank reserves to deposits 
and the interest restraints index enter with a significant negative coefficient indicating 
that these two measures may be capturing different aspects of financial repression. The 
estimated coefficient of real GDP retains a positive sign and is statistically significant. 
The inflation rate on the other hand remains statistically insignificant at conventional 
levels. Model C performs better than the previous models, in that it comfortably passes 
various diagnostic tests and shows very strong evidence of cointegration. In Model D, 
we drop the inflation rate, which was found to be insignificant in all the other 
specifications. Dropping this variable does not alter the results in any significant way.  
Table 2 contains five-year averages of the measure of the credit market disequilibrium 
from 1961 to 1995, based on Model D of Table 1. This measure is obtained by 
subtracting the predicted long-run equilibrium value of credit from the actual stock of 
real credit, and expressing this difference as a proportion of real total claims. According 
to our estimates, the South Korean credit market has been characterized by excess 
supply of credit in all these periods. Interestingly, the average proportion of excess 
credit was higher in the 1970s than in the 1980s and 1990s. Also note that during the 
first half of the 1980s, excess credit declined significantly to 6.66 per cent, but increased 
again to 14.5 per cent in the second half. Notably, in the period that preceded the crisis, 
excess credit declined to under 11 per cent, which is lower than the average in the 1970s 
and almost equal to that of the 1980s. Thus, while our results are consistent with the 
over-borrowing hypothesis, they warn against an over-simplification of the links 
between excess credit and the South Korean financial crisis, as our results suggest that 
the problem of excess credit has persisted for a long time before the crisis. Nevertheless, 
the existence of excess credit provides some clues, especially if it is examined in 
conjunction with other developments (Huang and Xu 1999). 
Table 2: Estimates of excess supply of credit 
Period EXCB 








Notes:   EXCB is excess supply of credit estimated using Model D in Table 1.   10
Table 3: Granger causality tests 
3 Lags  F-Test  F-Critical at 5%  Interpretation 
EXCESS → GPRODUCT  F(3,23) = 4.99  3.05 
GPRODUCT → EXCESS  F(3,23) = 1.28  3.05 
Unidirectional causality 
from excess credit to 
change in capital 
productivity 
4 Lags     
EXCESS → GPRODUCT  F(4,20) = 4.44  2.87 
GPRODUCT → EXCESS  F(4,20) = 5.14  2.87 
Bilateral causality 
between excess credit 
and capital productivity 
Notes:  GPRODUCT is the growth in the average productivity of capital where average productivity is 
measured by the ratio of the flow of current output to the capital stock. EXCESS is excess credit 
measured by the ratio of real excess supply of credit, estimated using the cointegrating vector of 
Model D - Table 1, to real broad credit. The Granger causality test was carried over the period 
1963-1995. In the EXCESS → GPRODUCT line, the F-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the 
set of estimated coefficients on the lagged EXCESS is not statistically different from zero. In the 
GPRODUCT → EXCESS line, the F-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the set of estimated 
coefficients on the lagged GPRODUCT is not statistically different from zero. 
 
We next assess whether the credit market disequilibrium could act as an indicator of 
capital productivity growth. Models of over-borrowing and over-investment predict that 
over-borrowing will ultimately be reflected in lower productivity growth, perhaps with 
some lag. The main reason is that borrowed funds are usually used to finance 
unproductive or even unprofitable projects. To test this implication, we employ a simple 
Granger causality test between our estimates of credit market disequilibrium and the 
growth in the average productivity of capital.6 It is well known that Granger causality 
tests are very sensitive to the number of lags used in the analysis. Thus in Table 3, we 
report the results with three and four lags.7 As can be seen from Table 3, in the case of 
three lags, we find unidirectional causality from our estimates of credit market 
disequilibrium to growth in capital productivity. The results in the case of four lags are 
slightly different where we find causality running in both directions. While the latter 
results are difficult to interpret, the evidence of causality from our estimates of credit 





                                                 
6   We measure the average productivity of capital by the ratio of the flow of current output to the capital 
stock. Data on the capital stock for the period 1963-90 were obtained from the World Bank Database 
compiled by Nehru et al. (1993). Capital stock figures from 1991 to 1997 were constructed following 
the perpetual inventory method assuming a depreciation rate of 4 per cent and uprating the price of 
capital goods in line with the GDP deflator. Investment and GDP data were obtained from 
International Financial Statistics (IMF 1998: 6). Excess credit is measured by the ratio of real excess 
supply of credit, estimated using the cointegrating vector of Model D – Table 1, to real broad credit.  
7   Granger tests with 2 lags produce similar results as with 3 lags and hence are not reported here.   11
4 Concluding  remarks 
The empirical analysis presented in this paper reveals the existence and persistence of 
excess credit in the South Korean credit market. These findings are consistent with the 
hypotheses of over-borrowing or over-investment which may reflect soft budget 
constraints and/or moral hazard. Our results are also consistent with the hypothesis that 
over-borrowing can persist as long as firms are able to refinance their unprofitable 
projects and cash shortfalls. In the 1980s when most of the debt was in local currency, 
the Korean monetary authorities were able to avert a crisis in spite of the presence of a 
large volume of non-performing loans, by inflating their way out of the problem (Choi 
1993; Nam 1994). By the mid 1990s, this was no longer possible as most of the debt 
was in foreign currency while international reserves that could cover for them were very 
low. The unwillingness of foreign banks and investors to renew or rollover credit meant 
that many firms could no longer finance their unprofitable projects. A conjecture that 
emerges from our analysis is that while excess credit and over-investment were not by 
themselves responsible for crisis, their conjunction with high levels of foreign debt and 
low foreign reserves could have contributed significantly to the South Korean financial 
crisis. 
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Appendix A: Summary of the main financial reforms in Korea 
Interest rates 
6 September 1979 The Monetary Board abolished the existing maximum interest rate 
on bank loans to make it possible for banks to alter their interest rate on loans. However, 
the Bankers Association of Korea, considering that banks themselves are not used to 
determining interest rates, decided to link interest rates on loans to the central bank’s 
rediscount rate.  
6 September 1979 The Monetary Board abolished the maximum interest rate on free 
instalment savings deposits and the maximum interest rate on personal checking 
deposits. 
17 May 1984 The Board allowed seven nationwide commercial banks, local banks, and 
the Korea Exchange Bank to engage in the negotiable certificate of deposit (CDs) from 
1 June. 
23 July 1984 A narrow band for loan rates was introduced so that banks could charge 
different rates according to the creditworthiness of the borrowers. 
5 December 1988 Interest rates on loans from banks and non-bank financial 
intermediaries were fully liberalized. 
5 December 1988 Interest rate on time deposits of a maturity greater than two years at 
banks, postal savings, and credit unions were liberalized. 
5 December 1988 Interest rates on time and savings deposits of a maturity greater than 
one year at mutual savings and finance companies were liberalized. 
21 November 1991 Lending rates liberalized further. Lending rates liberalized 
consisted of those on bank overdrafts; on the discount of commercial bills by banks, 
mutual savings, and finance companies; on the discount of commercial and trade bills 
by investment and finance companies; on the purchase of firms’ guaranteed papers by 
banks’ trust accounts; and on overdue loans by all financial institutions. 
21 November 1991 The liberalization of deposit rates applied to those on short-term, 
large denomination marketable instruments such as CDs, the sale of large denomination 
trade bills, commercial paper (CP), and repurchase agreements (RPs). 
21 November 1991 The scope of initial liberalization was extended to cover rates on 
long-term deposits with a maturity of 3 years offered by banks, mutual credit facilities, 
and credit unions and mutual time deposits with a maturity of two years and more 
offered by mutual savings and finance companies. 
21 November 1991 The issue rates of corporate bonds with a maturity of two years and 
more were deregulated. 
1 November 1993 All lending rates (apart from those financed by the government and 
the Bank of Korea’s rediscounts) were liberalized. 
1 November 1993 Rates on long-term deposits with a maturity of at least two years 
were completely liberalized.   14
1 November 1993 Interest rates on debentures and corporate bonds with a maturity of 
less than two years were liberalized. 
1 December 1994 Interest rates on bank and non-bank time deposits with a maturity of 
one year or more but less than two years were liberalized. 
1 December 1994 Banks were permitted to freely set the interest rates on policy loans 
financed through the aggregate credit ceilings system within their respective prime 
rates. 
24 July 1995 Interest rates on policy-based loans through the aggregate credit ceilings 
system of Bank of Korea were liberalized. 
20 November 1995 The Bank and government freed up the remaining regulated interest 
rates on bank and non-bank time deposits with a maturity of less than six months and on 
their instalment deposits with a maturity of less than one year. 
19 January 1996 The Bank of Korea lifted the restriction on the size of the premium a 
bank could charge over its prime lending rate, which had originally been imposed in 
order to prevent a sharp run-up in bank lending rates in the course of interest rate 
deregulation. 
Developments in money markets 
7 March 1986 The Monetary Board liberalized the rates on negotiable CDs, secured 
corporate bonds, and bank debentures. 
13 February 1987 The Monetary Board reduced the denomination of CDs from 100 
million won to 50 million won. 
5 December 1988 Interest rates on repurchase agreements, CP of a face value greater 
than 30 million won and maturity more than 91 days, financial debentures, and 
corporate bonds were fully liberalized. 
5 December 1988 New CP and conventional CP were merged into one. 
4 October 1989 The Bank and the government merged the call markets, previously 
segmented into an interbank market mainly for banks and the over-the-counter market 
between non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), which expanded the size of the money 
market (call markets, CP, CDs, RPs, treasury bills (TBs), and Bankers’ Acceptance). 
After the merger, the interbank rate was fully liberalized.  
19 October 1989 The Bank of Korea adjusted the maturity period of CDs issued by 
banks to other banking institutions from between 91 days and 180 days to between 30 
days and 180 days. 
21 November 1991 The liberalization of deposit rates applied to those on short-term, 
large denomination marketable instruments such as CDs, the sale of large denomination 
trade bills, CP, and RPs. 
21 November 1991 The issue rates of corporate bonds with a maturity of two years and 
more were completely deregulated.   15
19 December 1992 The Bank extended the maximum maturity of CDs from 180 days to 
270 days. 
1 November 1993 Interest rates on financial debentures and those corporate bonds with 
a maturity of less than two years were liberalized. Government and public bonds and 
monetary stabilization bonds were also to be issued at prevailing market rates.  
3 September 1993 The Bank lowered the minimum denomination of CDs from 50 
million won to 30 million won. 
18 July 1994 The minimum maturities of CDs and high denomination RPs were 
shortened from 91 days to 60 days.  
24 July 1995 The minimum maturities of short-term financial instruments including 
CDs, high value RPs, and high value CP were shortened from 60 to 30 days. 
Reserve requirements on demand deposits 
Effective 23 November 1987 The Monetary Board raised the minimum reserve 
requirement from 4.5 per cent to 7 per cent. 
20 April 1989 A marginal reserve requirement ratio of 30 per cent on the average 
increment of demand deposits and time and saving deposits was imposed. The marginal 
reserve requirements were abolished in February 1990. 
15 February 1990 The Bank raised reserve requirement ratios on time deposits, 
instalment savings deposits with maturity of two years or more and household 
instalment saving deposit from 7 per cent to 8 per cent. On all other deposits, the reserve 
requirement ratio increased from 10 per cent to 11.5 per cent. 
8 February 1991 The Bank introduced reserve requirements against mutual instalment 
deposits.  
23 April 1996 The reserve requirement on time and savings deposits of more than two 
years was brought down from 8 per cent to 6 per cent. 
23 April 1996 The reserve requirement on checking deposits, pass book deposits, 
saving deposits, time and saving deposits with a maturity of less than two years was 
lowered from 11.5 per cent to 9 per cent. 
8 November 1996 The reserve requirement on time and savings deposits of more than 
two years was brought down from 6 per cent to 4 per cent.  
8 November 1996 The reserve requirement on checking deposits, pass book deposits, 
saving deposits, time and saving deposits with maturity of less than two years was 
lowered from 9 per cent to 7 per cent. 